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ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEA TH-EFFECT OF PRIOR RELEASB
BY PARTY INJURED.-SOUthernh .Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co.
v. CGasn et. al., 36 S. E. (Ga.) 881, (1900). Cassin was injured by the
defendant company, May 6, 1892. He brought suit, and pending
the action the company paid him $2,500, taking a receipt which
read as follows: "In full settlement of my action against said com-
pany now pending in the city court of Atlanta, and also in full
settlement of all and any claim for damages, on my part, arising
out of the injury received by me on or about May 6, 1892."
Cassin died about five years'after the injury, and his wife brought
suit, on the ground that the death was due to the company's negli-
gence. The wife died pending suit, and it was continued for the
benefit of the children. Judgment for plaintiff. On appeal, judg-
ment reversed; two judges dissenting.
NOTES.
The majority opinion commends itself to reason, and is based on
the great weight of authority. Its grounds were, that the wife's
right in her husband's life are subordinate to his course of action
during his life ; that the husband, by contributory negligence, settle-
ment of the wrong by acceptance of payment, and by contract with
the defendant, may free the latter from liability to him ; and that,
finally, to allow the wife to recover, when a settlement had been
made by the husband, would destroy the likelihood of a compromise,
and directly encourage litigation.
The dissenting judges found some trouble in dealing with prior
decisions of their own court, but they satisfied themselves with the
following distinction: Where the deceased does some act prior to
or concurrent with the injury, and by it prevents any liability of the
defendant from arising, the wife cannot recover. But if' the defend-
ant once becomes liable to the injured party, a right of action
accrues to those entitled by law to compensation for his death, i. e.,
widow and children, and when death occurs the right is full and
complete. The injured party, before death, can do nothing to
impair this cause of action. The theory is-a cause of action is
given to the injured party, which he can use as he sees fit, and, by
force of the survival statute, upon his death it vests in his personal
representative. Another distinct and separate cause of action for
the homicide is given to the widow and children. This view is
supported by a number of decisions, some of which resulted from
the peculiar nature of the statutes which controlled them. For
instance, in Massachusetts, the statute (Pub. Stat., c. 112., § 212)
is penal in its effect. Under it, if the negligent act of the defendant
causes death, he must pay a fine in damages (limited), recoverable
by indictment for the use of the family. In Com. v. Boston & L. R.
.Corp., 134 Mass. 211 (1883), it was held that negligence on the
part of a passenger was no more a defence to an indictment for
damages than it would be in a murder case. The damages belong
to the next of kin, and not to the estate of the party injured.
Bowes v. Boston, 29 N. E. 633 (1892). This distinction would
lessen the effect of a Kentucky case, Donahue v. Drexler, 82 Ken.
157 (1884), in which case the party mortally injured by the criminal
use of a deadly weapon executed a release to the defendant. The
wife brought suit and recovered. The court said the statute created
a new cause of action, but that it was "a highly penal statute."
Other states which accord with the dissent are: Washington, Adams
v. R. R., 95 Fed. 938 (1899); Kansas, R. R. v. Bennett's Bt., 47
Pac. 183 (1896), under a statute very similar to Lord Campbell's
Act.; Mississippi. R. B. Co. v. Phillip. 64 Miss. 693 (1887); Ar-
kansas, Davis v. R. R. Co., 13 S. W. 801 (1890).
All the States, beginning with New York, in 1847, have passed
statutes creating a cause of action for the benefit of the family,
when the death of a member has resulted from a wrongful act.
The majority resemble closely Lord Campbell's Act (1846). Though
English judges have distinctly affirmed that the act created a new
cause of action, the cases hold that a settlement by the husband will
bar the right of the wife. Read v. R. R., 9 Best & S. 714 (1868);
NOTES.
Wood v. Gray, App. Cases 576 (1892). The English rule, in
another aspect, has been settled as follows: If the personal representa-
tive sues the defendant in tort for the benefit of the widow and
children, and recovers damages for the death, he cannot later sue
in tort for the injury to the person of the deceased, but he can bring
an action of contract and recover "the expense of the decedent's
sickness, nursing, medical attendance, and the like." Bradshaw v.
B. R. Co., 10 C. P. 189 (187.5); Leggett v. R. R., 1 Q. B. D. 599
(1876); Pulling v. R. B., 9 Q. B. D. 110 (1882).
The Read case is generally followed in this country. Tiffany,
after a consideration of all the statutes and citing many cases,
states the rule as follows: "If the deceased, in his life-time, has
done anything that would operate as a bar to a recovery by him of
damages for the personal injuries, this will operate equally as a bar
in an action by his personal representatives for his death. Thus, a
release by the party injured of his right of action, or a recovery of
damages by him for the injury, is a complete defence in the statutory
action." "Death by Wrongful Act," § 124. 1
In New York the courts admit that the statute creates a'new
cause of action, yet it has been ruled that "this new cause of action
is barred if there had been a previous judgment for the injury."
Littl wood v. Mayor, 89 N. Y. 24 (1882).
The Pennsylvania rule is clearly stated in Hill v. R. B., 35 At.
997 (1896). "The widow did not have such an independent action
for injuries causing her husband's death that he could not, in his
life-time, release or compound it."
Even where a statute has been construed to give two causes of
action, and the right to maintain two concurrent suits, a court has
held that the party injured could work "an extinguishment of the
primary cause of action" (Wisconsin). Browrn v. B. R. Co., 78
N. W. 773 (1899). It can be said that while the authorities are
fairly well balanced on the question of allowing concurrent suits,
they generally agree in admitting the conclusive effect of a release.
See als6 Halton v. Daly, 106 Ill. 131 (1883). Hecht Case, 32
N. E. 302 (Indiana, 1892) ; Lubrano v. Atlantic Mills, 32 Atl. 205
(Rhode Island, 1895). In this last case the court was influenced
by the confusion of damages that would result if the defendant were
subjected to two liabilities. Theref.,re if the personal rpresentative
of the deceased sued for the family and recovered he could not
afterward sue for injuries to the estate. "The measure of pain and
suffering or the estimated damage to one's estate cannot so definitely
be marked as to limit the liberality of a sympathetic jury."
F.K. S.
